THE NAVIGATOR
October 2025
THE CONSTRAINED INDO-PACIFIC: FRAGMENTATION, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE RACE FOR RESILIENCE
By Dr. Manali Kumar, Editor-in-Chief at 9DASHLINE
The Indo-Pacific’s strategic friction, driven by the US–China rivalry, is deeply complicated by widespread domestic fragility. October saw Washington intensify its economic counter-strategy — signing critical minerals frameworks with Japan and South Korea, and new trade deals across Southeast Asia — just as Beijing’s 15th Five-Year Plan signaled its intent to dominate advanced global industrial chains. Yet key regional players lack the bandwidth for full-spectrum geopolitical adaptation: India must pivot to transactional diplomacy with the Taliban while tackling the Ladakh statehood movement, and Japan’s new prime minister leads a fragile coalition under immense economic pressure. Internal instability is a critical constraint on external policy, and for most regional actors, the geopolitical contest remains secondary to the imperative of domestic resilience and political survival.
In this context, our briefs this month highlight the divergent models of sovereignty employed by the US and China. The Pukpuk Treaty between Australia and PNG reveals a strategic Western preference for deep, identity-shaping integration via military service, offering economic incentives in exchange for shared allegiance — a model China views as intrusive. Conversely, the IMF–World Bank meetings illustrate the enduring US power to assert its policy sovereignty by leveraging its shareholder weight, imposing an austerity playbook, and stalling governance reform that limits the political and financial freedom of the Global South. The region is thus presented with a stark choice: one model that seeks integration and shared identity through institutional power, and another that champions non-interference in exchange for compliance and respect for its core territorial claims.
Looking ahead, the region must brace for heightened volatility as the contest over critical minerals, sovereignty models, and the allegiance of young populations accelerates. Ensuring domestic resilience — not just external alignment — will define survival in 2026. As the Indo-Pacific adapts to these shifting dynamics, 9DASHLINE remains committed to providing the in-depth analysis you need to stay informed and ahead.
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THE PUKPUK TREATY: TRANSFORMING DEFENCE BY RESHAPING IDENTITY
By David MacSweeney, Founder at 9DASHLINE
Amid headlines dominated by strategic competition, the Pukpuk Treaty — the mutual defence agreement signed on 6 October 2025 between Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Australia — is set to redefine defence cooperation through the institutionalisation of identity-based integration, reshaping identity by linking the countries through shared military service.
Ahead of the much-publicised signing, PNG Defence Minister Billy Joseph was dispatched to China to ‘explain the treaty’ — a move aimed at addressing regional concerns, highlighting just how complex and consequential the region’s strategic landscape has become. Beijing, for its part, had cautioned Port Moresby to ‘properly handle issues bearing on its sovereignty and long-term interests’.
The treaty commits the two governments to ‘protect their sovereignty, secure their mutual defence and security interests, and contribute to regional stability and security by strengthening and expanding defence cooperation through enhanced capability, interoperability, and integration’. Yet amid intense commentary focused on the wider strategic implications lies what may be its most significant aspect: the announcement that thousands of PNG’s brightest and most able-bodied citizens are eligible to serve in the Australian Defence Force (ADF), including a potential route to citizenship.
With a raft of bilateral Pacific agreements of its own, notably with the Solomon Islands and the Cook Islands, Beijing likely perceives the treaty as more than a conventional security arrangement — instead a framework designed to bind two nations together not just through shared interests, but shared people.
PNG must, of course, remain free to pursue its own interests. Yet the implications of this dynamic — integration based on military service — are significant. Designed to outlast future political cycles, generations of PNG’s young people can now live, train, and work in Australia, their lives increasingly shaped by Western institutions and the internalisation of democratic norms and values. In a region where every form of connection — culture, sport, technology, and the labour market — has become an arena for influence, Beijing’s concerns are not without merit.
The deepening nature of the bilateral relationship is set to deliver a form of dual conditioning: part economic, part cultural. Pronounced economic disparity means material incentives will see migration flow mostly in one direction — at around USD 2,500, PNG’s per-capita GDP is approximately twenty times lower than the starting annual salary of an ADF soldier. At the same time, shared experiences — training, discipline, and efforts to develop a collective identity — will, in the long term, lead to deeper bonds. British Army Gurkhas and French Foreign Legionnaires have long demonstrated how sacrifice and symbolism — the kukri, the white kepi — can help to forge an enduring sense of loyalty and pride.
While the treaty raises questions about state dependency and allegiance, it also mandates that any action be taken ‘in accordance with [each] government’s constitutional processes’, thus providing a critical opt-out if participation is deemed not in the national interest — a point Defence Minister Billy Joseph likely emphasised during his visit to Beijing.
While the mutual nature of the Pukpuk Treaty is designed to embed reciprocity, Port Moresby now faces the challenge of converting integration into strategic benefits through the return of skills or enhanced leverage rather than a one-way transfer of talent. For Australia, the move reinforces efforts to position itself as the region’s security partner of choice, complementing programmes like AUKUS with a softer, more human dimension built on trust and shared service.
If manpower becomes the new currency of alliance-building, the Pukpuk Treaty may redefine what partnership means in the Pacific — transforming core ideas of identity and loyalty by reshaping how soldiers think and feel about the armed forces in which they serve.
MISSED OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE GLOBAL SOUTH AT IMF-WORLD BANK ANNUAL MEETINGS
by Dr. Kirthana Ganeson, World Trade Institute
The Annual International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank meetings took place from 13 to 18 October in Washington DC, against a harrowing global backdrop of significant economic and geopolitical turbulence. The meetings ultimately failed to serve as the much-needed beacon of hope amid economic challenges faced by developing nations, and highlighted the extent to which the United States’ political interests shape institutional priorities.
In her plenary speech, IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva cautioned leaders in the current era, where “uncertainty is the new normal”, referencing ongoing trade tensions, tighter fiscal constraints, and rising borrowing costs. The IMF’s latest World Economic Outlook reflects this pessimism, with global growth (real GDP, annual per cent change) projected at 3.0 per cent in 2025, with a marginal increase to 3.1 per cent in 2026 as escalating tariffs and protectionist measures continue to destabilise markets and restrict trade flows.
One silver lining in this is the Indo-Pacific region, where although growth has slowed compared to the previous decade, it still exceeds the global average. China is projected to grow by 4.8 per cent in 2025 and 4.2 per cent in 2026, while India leads major emerging economies with a strong 6.6 per cent growth this year. Despite these promising numbers, structural challenges such as ageing populations, declining productivity, and increasing youth unemployment remain.
While IMF and World Bank leaders rightly acknowledged existing challenges, their strategies to address them raise substantial concerns, especially for the Global South. Discussions on governance reform at the World Bank were effectively stalled due to the US’ rejection of calls from African, Asian, and Latin American economies for a shareholding review. With any path towards making voting power proportionate to economic weight blocked, power asymmetries between the US and developing countries within these institutions will remain entrenched.
The IMF has restructured its dedicated climate and gender units by merging them into a new division called the Macro-Financial and Structural Policies Division. Established under a Board mandate in 2021 and 2022, respectively, these units were regarded as crucial for fostering growth and stability. Although “mission creep” is ostensibly the main reason for this decision, given the undercurrent of heavy debt burdens and reduced official development assistance, this restructuring could signal a deprioritisation of these issues, potentially with compounded negative effects on developing countries. Without a coordinated multinational effort on climate and gender, adverse impacts could affect other sectors, including education and health, where development opportunities are crucial to enhancing freedoms and the quality of life in developing nations.
Moreover, the World Bank and IMF continue to cling to the old austerity playbook despite mounting economic challenges. The IMF’s Fiscal Monitor called for stringent spending cuts, while the World Bank doubles down on private capital mobilisation through its “One World Bank Group” restructuring. In a climate where meaningful spending and investments are crucial, Global South nations are facing pressure to create “business-friendly environments” and reforming public-sector wages to predominantly focus on the private sector, as cited in a report from the Development Committee meeting.
*All views expressed in this brief are solely those of the author and do not represent the views of any affiliated organisations.
ACROSS THE INDO-PACIFIC
South Asia
Recent Afghanistan-Pakistan border clashes resulted in dozens killed and hundreds wounded, prompting emergency talks in Doha that culminated in an immediate ceasefire agreement on 19 October. Initiated by Pakistan, the attacks—among the worst since 2021—were allegedly driven by the persistent haven provided to anti-Pakistan terror proxies along the Afghan border. The violence comes on the heels of Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi’s visit to India. New Delhi’s decision to upgrade its technical mission in Kabul to a full embassy signals a shift in Indian policy towards the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. This move reflects a pragmatic acceptance of reality, favouring transactional diplomacy focused on continuing humanitarian assistance, protecting long-standing projects, and developing strategic leverage against Pakistan.
New Delhi also hosted a high-level visit with Sri Lankan Prime Minister Harini Amarasuriya. While addressing the NDTV World Summit and holding meetings with Prime Minister Narendra Modi and other senior leaders, she pressed for deeper economic integration, including upgrading the 1998 Free Trade Agreement (FTA) into a broader economic-technology pact. Meanwhile, Geneva kept Sri Lanka under international scrutiny when the UN Human Rights Council extended by two years the OHCHR evidence-gathering mandate into alleged war crimes from the civil war.
The arrest of activist Sonam Wangchuk in India, after protests that turned violent, has focused attention on Ladakh’s statehood movement. Wangchuk’s movement is demanding statehood, Sixth Schedule safeguards, and greater local control over jobs and resources after the 2019 reorganisation. Authorities responded by imposing curfews, restricting communications, and charging Wangchuk with incitement. Similarly, across the Line of Control (LoC), protests in Pakistan-administered Kashmir turned violent, killing nine. While the two preceding mobilisations focused on local economic grievances, this latest action by the Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee is broader, advancing a 38-point list of demands encompassing both economic concerns and the provincial legislative structure.
Bangladesh remains politically tense. Its International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) jailed 15 serving army officers on allegations linked to enforced disappearances and related crimes during the Hasina government. While welcomed by rights groups, the move was met with resistance by sections of the military, further escalating tensions between the interim government of Muhammad Yunus and the armed forces. This institutional unease was made explicit when the army chief called for earlier elections. The ICT’s chief prosecutor has requested the death penalty for ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina over her alleged role in protest-related killings. Meanwhile, Tarique Rahman, the self-exiled scion of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), announced plans to return home, positioning himself as a leading contender ahead of the next national election.
Southeast Asia
The annual Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit took place in Kuala Lumpur from 26 to 28 October, with a number of world leaders, including US President Donald Trump, Lula da Silva of Brazil and Mark Carney of Canada, converging for the regional gathering. Newly elected Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and Korean President Lee Jae Myung also attended, along with Chinese Premier Li Qiang. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi decided not to attend despite previously indicating that he would. Notable outcomes included the signing of a ceasefire deal between Cambodia and Thailand witnessed by President Trump, and the formal accession of Timor-Leste as the 11th member of ASEAN after years of waiting. Dili was previously granted observer status in 2022.
At the summit, the United States announced trade deals with Cambodia and Malaysia, along with frameworks of trade deals with Thailand and Vietnam. The deal with Malaysia coincided with the two sides elevating their bilateral relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership as well as a memorandum of understanding on critical minerals. Malaysia also formally handed over the chairmanship of ASEAN to the Philippines, which will chair the regional bloc in 2026.
Earlier in October, Singapore upgraded diplomatic ties with both Australia and New Zealand to the level of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, and the United Kingdom and United States announced new targeted sanctions against cyberscam operators in Myanmar, Cambodia, and Thailand.
East Asia
In her first major test as Japanese prime minister, Sanae Takaichi hosted a summit with President Trump, pledging to “create a new golden age” for the Japan–US alliance. The charm offensive appears to have gone well, with both sides signing a framework agreement on critical minerals and rare earths. However, bigger tests are to come for Takaichi, who heads a fragile coalition amid mounting economic challenges. While her new partner, the Japan Innovation Party, backs her plan to accelerate defence spending to 2 per cent of GDP by March 2026, the two sharply diverge on fiscal policy. Early polling shows a 74 per cent approval rating for her cabinet, but she will have to post quick economic results to sustain the momentum. Without visible gains, her narrow mandate and fragile coalition could quickly erode, undermining both her leadership and her government’s stability.
In Beijing, the Chinese Communist Party unveiled its 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030) — a central policy blueprint defining China’s economic direction and serving as the next step toward its Vision 2035 modernisation goals. As Trivium China notes, the plan aims to move beyond the debt-fuelled, property-heavy model that powered earlier growth, to a new framework in which China dominates the high end of global industrial value chains, which poses a direct threat to the manufacturing bases of the US and Europe and sets the stage for deeper structural friction over trade and technology.
South Korea will take centre stage as APEC host (Gyeongju, 31 October to 1 November), using its agenda to stress supply chain resilience and critical minerals security — leveraging its dual role as APEC chair and Mineral Security Partnership lead to act as a pragmatic broker amid rising US–China trade tensions. In a bid to woo President Trump amid challenging trade negotiations, Seoul awarded the US president the “Grand Order of Mugunghwa” and a replica gold crown. The two sides signed a trade agreement cutting US auto-parts tariffs on South Korean imports to 15 per cent and outlining a USD 350 billion South Korean investment package, including USD 200 billion in staged cash commitments, and USD 150 billion in shipbuilding cooperation.
In Taiwan, the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) elected “dark horse” candidate Cheng Li-wun on a notably pro-China platform. It is too early to gauge how her victory might reshape the party (which has a majority in the legislature), but with President Lai Ching-te seeking to raise defence spending to more than 3 per cent of GDP — a move, which the KMT has cautiously supported — a shift in the party’s policy stance could pose serious challenges for Taiwan-US relations. Elsewhere, amid fears the left-leaning DPP’s earlier missteps “lost Trump”, the Lai administration has begun courting the MAGA media ecosystem as well as presenting Israel as a model to emulate.
The Pacific
Bougainville’s newly re-elected president, Ishmael Toroama, reaffirmed the region’s “bold and non-negotiable” drive for independence, installing a 14-member executive council mandated to press Port Moresby for a political settlement reflecting the region’s 2019 referendum outcome.
France’s National Assembly voted to delay New Caledonia’s provincial elections until June 2026, citing the need to implement the Bougival Agreement on autonomy; pro-independence FLNKS leaders rejected the decision as a unilateral breach of trust. In Vanuatu, Prime Minister Charlot Salwai reiterated that Port Vila remains open to a new bilateral security accord with Australia, but will “not be subject to bullying from larger countries”, signalling cautious engagement after a period of domestic political instability and shifting regional allegiances.
In Samoa, Wellington concluded negotiations over the 2024 naval accident involving HMNZS Manawanui, agreeing to pay US$3.6 million in compensation after the vessel sank in Samoan waters. The settlement ends a delicate chapter in bilateral relations due to ongoing sensitivities about maritime incidents. Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown hailed the completion of a US-backed deep-sea research expedition aboard the E/V Nautilus as a scientific and diplomatic milestone, strengthening Cook–US collaboration in seabed mapping and ocean governance as Rarotonga considers future seabed-mining opportunities.
Palau advanced its Malakal Port modernisation project in partnership with the US, a move seen as both economic stimulus and strategic reinforcement of the US maritime presence under the Compact of Free Association. Meanwhile, Kiribati officials called for a US visa exemption after a parliamentary delegation was briefly detained in transit to the Northern Marianas over visa issues, reigniting debate over transit-related concerns faced by Pacific Islanders when travelling through American territories.
Tuvalu formally joined the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), signalling its intent to integrate environmental diplomacy with national climate resilience priorities. This month saw Nauru re-elect David Adeang as president following parliamentary votes that reinforced his administration’s pro-Taipei and pro-Canberra alignment amid intensifying competition for recognition in the central Pacific. Nauru also received the first foreign detainees under a contentious deal with Australia. The UK continues its small-scale capacity-building push, hosting Royal Solomon Islands Police Force officers for a leadership course in London, as part of efforts to deepen Commonwealth policing ties. Tonga welcomed a Chinese naval hospital ship for a seven-day visit that saw it provide medical services and academic exchange — the fourth such visit to Tonga under Mission Harmony.
A recent Lowy Institute report warned of a looming USD 200 million annual shortfall as New Zealand and other partners prepare to cut aid by roughly 35 per cent and other Western donors scale back commitments, leaving Australia responsible for nearly half of all Pacific development financing and creating space for expanding Chinese assistance programmes. Meanwhile, a separate Lowy Institute report has proposed a “Pacific Eyes” intelligence-sharing initiative to strengthen coordination among Australia, New Zealand, Fiji and Papua New Guinea. Advocates describe it as a counterweight to China’s growing cyber and intelligence footprint, though Pacific commentators warn it risks undermining sovereignty and overstretching local capacities.
New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters warned that Wellington’s “over-reliance” on China for trade has placed it under “strategic pressure”, further arguing for diversification. In AUKUS-related news, Donald Trump told Australian media that Canberra would still receive its planned submarines “though the decision won’t be mine to make”, while UK defence officials privately cautioned that AUKUS production timelines risk being delayed unless industrial pace increases. Finally, Australia and Papua New Guinea signed the Pukpuk Treaty, a mutual defence agreement. See this month’s brief for further details.
THE BEST OF 9DASHLINE
This month, some of our best reads focus on the shifting architecture of power and partnership in the Indo-Pacific, where strategic autonomy, the clash between values and realpolitik, and transactional security commitments are redefining state choices.
From Pakistan’s risky pact trading military security for financial aid and potential entanglement in Middle Eastern conflicts to Indonesia’s complex non-alignment aimed at balancing the rival Koreas and managing its vital relationship with China, these analyses reveal how middle powers and external actors must prioritise economic and security pragmatism over ideological or normative consistency.
Together, they spotlight the increasing tension between the need for institutional competence and the persistent pull of political loyalty or economic necessity, underscoring the deep structural risks and trade-offs driving the Indo-Pacific’s highly contested and fluid order.
SAUDI-PAKISTAN STRATEGIC DEFENCE AGREEMENT: A DANGEROUS GAMBLE WITH REGIONAL CONSEQUENCES
The strategic mutual defence pact signed between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan on 17 September 2025 formalises their close military ties into a binding framework, risking both regional instability and the undermining of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime due to Pakistan’s offer to make its nuclear capabilities “available.”
In this insightful read, Dr. Imran Khurshid (International Centre for Peace Studies) argues that while the agreement provides financial relief and ideological legitimacy for Pakistan, it is a “costly gamble” that compels Islamabad to respond militarily to aggression against Saudi Arabia. This could draw Pakistan into Middle Eastern conflicts where its own national interests are marginal and divert strategic focus away from its sensitive border with India and severe domestic challenges.
The agreement’s implications for India introduce uncertainties, requiring vigilance and strategic foresight as New Delhi weighs its partnership with Riyadh against its concerns about Islamabad.
BALANCING THE PENINSULA: INDONESIA’S DIPLOMACY BETWEEN THE TWO KOREAS
Indonesia’s diplomacy is entering an assertive phase marked by a goal to balance relations among competing powers, as evidenced by the Foreign Minister’s 11 October 2025 visit to Pyongyang, which coincided with the reopening of the North Korean embassy. This move aims to position Indonesia as a balancing actor on the Korean Peninsula.
However, it has raised security concerns in Seoul regarding the KF-21 fighter jet project—a joint development with South Korea—prompting questions about whether Jakarta’s renewed ties with Pyongyang could jeopardise their strategic defence cooperation, which includes significant trade and a Special Strategic Partnership.
Here, Geo Dzakwan Arshali (Universiti Utara Malaysia and S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies) argues that the success of Indonesia’s free and active foreign policy depends on its ability to engage North Korea transparently within UN-sanctioned parameters without undermining its vital strategic relationship with South Korea, as any misstep could lead Seoul to limit the transfer of critical defence capabilities.
BEYOND SYMBOLISM: WHY INDONESIA NEEDS CHINA EXPERTISE TO MATCH ITS AMBITION
Indonesia recently made the highly unusual move of appointing a Vice Ambassador to China, reflecting Jakarta’s recognition that its relationship with Beijing — as its largest trading partner and top source of investment — has “outgrown the old model” and now requires an unprecedented level of institutional attention.
However, Dr. Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat (Center of Economic and Law Studies) critiques the appointment of Irene, a politician with limited foreign policy credentials, arguing that it risks perpetuating a long-standing habit of prioritising political loyalty over technical expertise, despite the complexity of managing China’s strategic and economic engagement. He concludes that while creating the post marks a step forward in recognising China’s importance, it will prove a “missed opportunity” unless Indonesia uses it as the beginning of a broader, deliberate strategy to build “China literacy” and institutional capacity across its government, academia, and media — a foundation necessary for Indonesia to be a credible regional leader and manage China’s influence effectively.
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The Navigator is produced by:
Hunter Marston, Daniel McIntyre, Luana Correia, Chetan Rana, Dr Manali Kumar and David MacSweeney.
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